

THE **PACIFIST**

for a nonviolent perspective

Cyberwar

facts and myths

Arms trade

heroes and villains

Conversion

the lost opportunity



Laying a White Poppy - hoping for a better future

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The PPU is the oldest non-sectarian pacifist organisation in Britain. Through the War Resisters' International it has links with similar groups throughout the world.

TAX RESISTANCE

The PPU has been withholding that proportion of taxes due which it has calculated goes to the Ministry of Defence. Despite being taken to court it continues to be the longest running case of tax resistance in Britain.

CHILDREN AND WAR PROJECT

Among the Project work is a campaign for a voluntary ban on the advertising of 'war toys' on television. Without change children will become the next generation that continues the same processes of war preparation and war-making.

PEACE EDUCATION

The Project provides resources for use within the educational system.

WHITE POPPY AND REMEMBRANCE

Each November the PPU, through the promotion of the White Poppy - a symbol of hope and deeper understanding of peace and war - challenges the romantic, sentimental and ultimately destructive view of war through alternative activity.

Northern Ireland: Nonviolent Perspectives

Northern Ireland: Nonviolent Perspectives aims to meet the often felt need for simple but reliable information about the history and background of the conflict without bias towards one or the other parties. A selection of articles illustrates the deeply rooted divisions within Northern Ireland society - leading to the situation where no-one under thirty can remember



'peace' in the province in which over 3,000 people have been killed since 1969. On the other hand there are glimmers of hope ending with the comment: 'We are all part of the problem and potentially part of the solution.'

Price £2.50 (£3.00 by post)

NEW FROM THE PPU

Cover photo: Ivan Kyncl
Cenotaph, London 8 November 1992.

Dirty dealing

Iraqgate is being presented by much of the media as a classic 'whodunnit', with traditional 'heroes' and 'villains'. **Bill Hetherington** wonders whether there are any heroes in a sordid tale which led to British taxpayers paying not only for weapons used by the British forces in the Gulf War, but some of those used by Iraqi forces as well.

IT WAS THE confession of Alan Clark, former Minister of State for 'Defence' Procurement, that he had been 'economical with the actualite' that first excited the Press. Giving evidence at the trial of executives of Matrix-Churchill for breaching the government embargo on military supplies to Iraq, he acknowledged that in January 1989, less than six months after the ceasefire in the bloody eight-year war between Iraq and Iran, he had advised British machine tool companies applying for export licences to emphasise the potential peaceful purposes of their equipment, even though it was unlikely that it would be used for such purposes.

A matter of Whitehall cosmetics to keep the record ambiguous.

Arguing that there was 'nothing dishonest' in stating that Iraq was using dual-use equipment for general engineering purposes, he added, 'All I didn't say was "and for making munitions"' - it was 'a matter of Whitehall cosmetics to keep the record ambiguous'.

It is hardly suprising that such economy with the truth should have invited comment. What has been given less attention, however, was his unusually frank - for a politician - avowal that he saw his earlier job as minister in the Trade and Industry Department, whilst the Iran-Iraq war was still continuing, as being to promote exports, that Iran was 'the enemy' and that western interests were 'well served by Iran and Iraq fighting each other'.

That war took half a million lives - 50,000 of them civilian, and most of the military ones those of conscripts with

little choice and some of them no more than children forced or seduced into uniform. That is what the economical Alan Clark is describing as 'well serving western interests'. Small wonder that long before the present generation of self-serving politicians like Mr Clark were even born the name Merchants of Death was coined for him and his ilk. He may have 'come clean' at last, but he is hardly a hero.

What of the Matrix-Churchill defendants? It is not surprising that in view of Alan Clark's frankness the case against them collapsed, but it is difficult to see them as the injured innocents the Press would have us believe. Even without the government's guidelines, published in 1985, banning exports of anything that might 'exacerbate or prolong the conflict', it is clear that the defendants knew that their products would be used for the purposes of killing and therefore serve inhumane rather than humane purposes. It ought not to require 'government guidelines' to prohibit such activity any more

than it should require government guidelines to prohibit the export of components for gas chambers. The fact that the defendants were clearly colluding with governmental bending of its own rules may have gone to mitigation, but the defendants can hardly claim to have clean hands.

From a legal point of view it may be argued that it is always improper to bring a prosecution that is bound to collapse, because it is a waste of public funds (the argument that people ought not without good cause be subjected to the strain of criminal proceedings has rather less force than usual in this particular case).

This leads us to the matter of the 'public interest immunity' certificates issued by various of Alan Clark's colleagues, alleging that numerous documents relevant to the case should not be disclosed to the defence lest the 'public interest' be harmed. As with most matters obscured by the Official Secrets Acts, one may be reasonably sure that whenever such a phrase is used the government has something to hide from 'the public interest'. After the judge, to his credit, overruled the certificates, allowing us to have a glimpse of the shady wheeling and dealing between ministers and manufacturers, we heard the mealy-mouthed justification that ministers had an overriding public duty to sign such certificates and then submit them to

Amongst the matters which they were trying to cover up was the fact that so far from being a British firm the patriotic-sounding Matrix-Churchill was actually Iraqi-owned - no wonder it was so keen to export to Iraq



the judge's scrutiny. That clearly makes nonsense of the individual discretion and responsibility that, on the face of it, ministers exercise in signing such certificates. It would be as odious and oppressive, for example, as a magistrate issuing a search warrant without being personally satisfied that a reasonable case has been made out.

So far from the public interest being served, what we have seen is a collusion of cabinet ministers covering up for each

other. Amongst the matters which they were trying to cover up was the fact that so far from being a British firm the patriotic-sounding Matrix-Churchill was actually Iraqi-owned - no wonder it was so keen to export to Iraq!

But that was not all. It has now been revealed that the British Government was so eager for war in the Middle East that it arranged to back the arms sales through the Export Credit Guarantee Department - and as Saddam Hussein, not unsurprisingly knowing he was on to a good thing, neglected to pay, no less than £54 million worth of armament-related 'sales' to Iraq have actually been paid for by the British exchequer, or in other words the British taxpayer. The British government, it thus seems, was not even ultimately motivated by the money it could make out of killing - it ensured that Saddam could have free weaponry courtesy of the British taxpayer so that, presumably, the British army and air force would be 'justified' in fighting in the Gulf. Disgusting though it is, one can understand the greedy motive of arms for profit - giving away arms that will inevitably be used against one's own troops is something else.

In so far as it had a policy on the matter, the British government appears to have taken the simplistic view that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' - and we know what kind of uneasy bedfellows that has led to over the years - collusion with Stalinist repression in WW2, relying on dictators in Portugal and Spain, and juntas in Turkey and Greece, to resist the Soviet threat, supplying arms to military regimes in Argentina (another biting the hand that fed it) and Chile in fear of left-wing influence...


The sleaze of Iraqgate is being exposed bit by bit. But it is only one episode in a century and more of such dirty deals. Britain eagerly supplied both sides when Japan invaded

China in 1931, and Hermann Goering's emergent Luftwaffe was enthusiastically supplied with British aero engines.

We know where that led to. We know the result of arming Argentina and Iraq. We have seen the double-dealing, the equivocation and attempts to cover up Iraqgate. We have heard the rumours of enrichment from Prime Ministerial nepotism. None of this can give much confidence in the efficacy of John Major's vaunted 'arms register' - if the government can flout its own

guidelines with impunity it can equally defraud the register.

Time was when politicians' private peccadillos were forgiven, provided probity was maintained in public affairs. Now, it seems that dirty laundry is deliberately washed in public to divert attention from the enormity of governmental mismanagement. It would take, however, more than the labour of a thousand Hercules to cleanse the stench of human flesh slaughtered by the dirtiest trade known to commerce.



A bi-monthly update of wars and armed conflicts worldwide.

A very profitable war

BRITAIN MADE more than £650 million profit from the Gulf war because contributions from foreign governments exceeded Ministry of Defence spending according to the National Audit Office. The war against Saddam cost Britain £1.5 billion while contributions from foreign governments amounted to more than £2.15 billion.

The report provides the first full analysis of the cost of the war. It shows the biggest contributor to the Treasury was Kuwait which paid £660

the cost of the war at £3 billion. This was reduced to £2.5 billion and now has been cut to £2.434 billion.

The report also confirms that the Export Credit Guarantee Department, which financed British exports to Iraq, has left the taxpayer to pick up a £940 million bill which the Iraqis have refused to meet.

Peaceful and stable

THE MINISTRY of Defence, departing from its normal refusal to comment on individual arms sales acknowledged that BL755 cluster bombs made in Britain were supplied to Yugoslavia. These are now in the hands of Serbian armed forces.

These devastating weapons are among huge quantities of munitions supplied to Belgrade in the 1980s.

The BL755 consists of 147 bomblets in a single canister, and releases 2,000 high velocity shrapnel fragments. They are anti-personnel weapons designed for 'soft' targets - human beings and are designed to kill and maim over a large area.

The bombs were supplied to Yugoslavia when it was 'peaceful and stable', said a ministry spokesman.

The Gulf war left Britain £650m in profit

million. The others were Saudi Arabia, £582 million; the United Arab Emirates, £278 million; Germany, £274 million; Japan, £192 million; South Korea, £18 million; Hong Kong, £16 million and Belgium, £15 million. Other countries provided another £14 million, and Britain also received £108 million from Saudi Arabia, mainly free petrol, ammunition and loaned equipment. The report shows that the MoD initially overestimated

Afghanistan	AT/S
Angola	AT/C
Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh	C
Bosnia	C
Cambodia	AT/S
Chad	AT/S
Colombia	S
East Timor	CT
El Salvador	AT
Ethiopia	S
Georgia: Abkhazia	S
S Ossetia	S
Guatemala	CT/S
Israel/Palestine	CT
Israel/Lebanon	CT
India (Punjab)	CT
Kurds/Iraq	CT
Kurds/Turkey	S
Kashmir (India/Pakistan)	CT
Moldov	CT
Mozambique	AT/S
Myanma (Burma)	CT/S
Niger/Tuareg	CT
N. Ireland	CT
Peru	CT
Philippines	CT/S
Senegal (Casamance)	S
Sierra Leone	C
Somalia	C
South Africa	CT
Sri Lanka	C
Sudan	C
Tibet	CT

C: continuing fighting
S: sporadic fighting
AT: armed truce
CT: continuing tensions

News

The 396 names of peace

THE HISTORICAL Thesaurus of English is being completed at Glasgow University's Department of English Language. It is thought to be the first historical thesaurus to be compiled for any language. It will include more than half a million words from Old English to the present day, arranged according to meaning and sense.

Changes in vocabulary help us to understand how culture and society changes and develops. New words might be added during periods of intense upheaval or old words might acquire new meaning. 'Take warfare', says Christian Kay, who is supervising the project, 'an extremely large section.

There are lots of different words for sword, in Old and Middle English, but as technology advances you can see the enormous number of newer terms coming into use.'

Number of words recorded

Health and Disease	17,584
War	16,864
Food	13,001
Music	10,712
Religion	10,225
Evil	6,597
Art	6,206
Drink	4,929
Education	4,092
Good	3,584
Killing	1,472
Death	1,188
Peace	396

Peace Arch

SCOTT THOE IN Norway thinks he has an ideal solution for the 43,000 tanks in Europe which are to be scrapped. He wants to weld them together into a gigantic peace arch measuring more than a kilometre and has already enlisted politicians, artists and engineers from eight countries to help erect the monument on the Polish-German border.

The Germans reckon it would cost £10,000 to destroy just one tank, and that's without calculating the environmental cost of destroying asbestos linings and toxic camouflage paint. The first 800 tanks are waiting in Schleswig-Holstein, northern Germany. ■

The wages of war

IT WAS SHOCKING to hear, in one of those rare 'joined up sentences', from President Bush, that nuclear missiles are a 'major danger to world peace', when only a short while ago they were the essential guardians of that very same peace. And so he signed the hastily cobbled together START 2 treaty which will, if it ever gets ratified, cut the number of nuclear warheads that Russia and the US have, to a number that can wipe out most of life on the earth only twice. It's great to hear that someone cares! Still it's a good wheeze the US is offering to help dismantle the weapons since Russia lacks the technology and this should keep a lot of people occupied for a very long time.

Meanwhile up in Rosyth where £100 million has already been spent on what the locals call 'the hole that cost a mint' - the dry dock site intended to hold the Trident refits, Britain's very own contribution to nu-

According to a recent study by the European Commission there are 50 European regions dependent on either the 'defence' industry or military spending. About 3 million EC worker - 2.4 per cent of the workforce - are dependent on the military of 'defence' industries. Most of these are in France, Britain and Germany.

clear proliferation, there is a lot of nail biting going on. The area has never really suffered from the recession because money has always poured into the naval dockyard from the MoD but with the wall coming down, the 'peace dividend' for a lot of people is a P45 or its

continental equivalent. Confrontation is now no longer between the east and the west but between the north and the west as the Rosyth and Devonport dockyards fight to secure the Trident contract. Reducing the number of nuclear warheads, let alone missiles is the last thing anyone wants.

Closure of either dockyard is likely to have a devastating effect on the surrounding area. Devonport dockyard and the naval complex, for example, supports 30,000 jobs, generates £520 million a year and gives orders to some 600 local firms. In Plymouth 20 per cent of the workforce is dependent on the dockyard and the Navy and 30 per cent of all local income comes from military spending.

Great things seemed possible as the Berlin Wall fell and military tensions eased in Europe. In its 1991 Human Devel-

The peace dividend for a lot of people is a P45 or its continental equivalent



¹ Whatever happened to the Peace Divident? The post-Cold - War Armaments Momentum. Marek Thee. Spokesman. £7.95

Slovenia

opment Report the United Nations Development Programme estimated that cuts of 2-4 per cent a year in global military spending could free \$200 billion to \$300 billion a year leading to savings of \$2,000 billion during this decade. Even taking into account increased social spending Western countries would be able to increase their foreign aid, it said, cautiously welcoming a new era. These and other expectations were at best naive. If wishes, hopes and beliefs could make things come true, we would now be living in a far better world because hope surely was in the air as never before.

The problem was that 'there was little substantial political-strategic and historical thinking or theory of international relations behind these post-Cold War musings', writes Marek Thee¹. 'The sudden eruption of the Gulf crisis brought disillusionment. Though a fundamental shift in the global power configuration had actually taken place it could not eliminate the deep structures of contemporary international affairs, embedded in relations of power.' The armament drive, inherited from the Cold War thus remains in force, rooted in the military-technological momentum and the socio-political environment. Furthermore the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar competitive international military-political environment strengthens rather than weakens the quest for military preparedness. This is seen in the many attempts at joint projects in which each country want to have the lion's share and the economic advantage that flows from this.

The transitional costs of the end of the Cold War and the inadequacy of government response across Western Europe, have meant that we are worse, not better off. Military cuts are taking place in an unplanned flurry, with little co-ordination between state and industry and between govern-

ments. There is no clear strategy for handling the run-down of military expenditure. Savings are being absorbed in other sectors, or going to keeping the public sector borrowing requirement lower than it would otherwise be. To have a peace dividend substantial political will is required, and this has been significantly lacking.

The major response by companies and governments to the declining military orders and therefore increase in unemployment has been a more aggressive sales drive. The fight

for a bigger slice of the global arms market has become increasingly bloody with UK companies losing out. The German arms industry has significantly increased and US arms exports, in contrast to Europe's have remained stable. The US has plainly decided that it will fight to maintain its huge share of the world arms market.

The tragedy of 1992 was that not only was there no peace dividend but there was no peace either. ■

A bang not a wimper

The Ljubljana Peace Group has been active for ten years but in October 1992 it published its last news letter and dissolved itself. Its reasons for doing so are instructive. Below is an extract from the last editorial.

The continuing war in former Yugoslavia has changed our lives. None of us has the illusion that it is possible to continue to work in the ways we used to. The situation in Slovenia has changed. Many of the aims of our movement have been achieved. However, those forms of action which we developed are of little use

today. Our attempt to get a representative of the social movement elected to the new Parliament failed. The popularity of the project to demilitarize Slovenia suffered a set back after the short war of independence in 1991. What seemed to have been within reach before the Yugoslav military intervention, can now only be sustained as our long term goal. With the influx of refugees first from Croatia and now from Bosnia, the greater part of nongovernmental social activity has shifted. Its principal aim now is to provide help for the refugees. The

events in Croatia and Bosnia have had profound impact on us. The war by far exceeded our worse expectations of what could happen. However, as horrifying as the war is, for us as a peace movement, even more shocking was the reaction of the international peace movement. A couple of exceptions aside, it failed completely. It failed first to recognise and acknowledge the dangers of war in Yugoslavia and then to do anything within its power to avert it. We feel all the more bitter about this as in 1988 we toured Europe trying to explain what was going on in Yugoslavia and sounded warnings, but nobody listened.

When the war finally broke out, it was in the nature of things that the peace movement could not do much to stop it. Yet there was, in those years, much hectic activity. While old network started to dissolve, their remnants con-

tinued to be active and some of them formed new organisations. We were afraid that all the work has not brought about much good. We must say that we are concerned that some of these international organisations lack a democratic basis; we question their right to present themselves as representatives of international civil society; and we are deeply concerned at what appears to be an inappropriate and wasteful use of resources on actions and conferences that do little to challenge the fundamental basis of this war or relieve humanitarian suffering, but rather generate confusion and misunderstanding, nationally and internationally. We are convinced that the real problem lies with the ideas that determine the framework of much of Western peace activity. We have begun to be more and more concerned with the insufficiencies of the ideas and ideals, of the conceptual basis of the Cold War peace movement (which are imbedded in the Western peace tradition). They seem to be conducive to a blind and blinding activism that engulfs us in almost as damaging ways as the war. We have resolved not to participating in such an activism any more. We have decided to seriously think through the war and to rethink the ideas and concepts on which our peace movement was based and the international peace movement of which we were a part. In our view, this is a necessary condition on which alone it may be possible in the future to formulate new strategies for peace. We are not abettors of the idea of 'starting anew' for its own sake. New things are not necessarily better than those they have succeeded or replaced. We are convinced, however, that it is time to part with the ways that lead nowhere. Just because of the horrors of this war we feel that what is needed is clear thinking and analysis, not just the unthinking continuance of a 'knee jerk' activist response. ■



WELCOME TO HYPERWAR

In the wake of the Gulf War, some pundits proclaim that the United States has entered the War-by-Machine Era. **Erich H. Arnett** examines the issues.

IN THE AFTERMATH of the Gulf War, new battle lines have been drawn in the world of U.S. military planning. On one side are military planners in the Pentagon and at the war colleges. On the other side are a group of civilian weapons scientists and strategists who work for the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Defence Science Board, the national laboratories, and a bevy of contractors.

The two sides are engaged in a long-term struggle that will redefine the relationship of humans to machine in matters of war. But one outcome of the struggle already seems clear: No matter which side "wins," humans will lose.

At issue is a new generation of "brilliant" weapons—crewless tanks, cruise missiles that behave like kamikaze robots, advanced air defence missiles, and anti-missile satellites. Also at issue is the degree to which machines will make and carry out battle decisions independent of their human counterparts.

It is already a cliché to describe the advent of electronic warfare as a "revolution." Many tacticians agree that the electronic spectrum—measured both by dollars and by tactical and strategic importance—has matched or surpassed the importance of land, sea, and air. Computers, sensors, and related equipment now account for roughly half the cost of Western weapons, combat aircraft, and warships. As a result, war is becoming unimaginably—and unmanageably—fast. Air Force planners call it "hyperwar."

As the lessons of the hyperwar waged against Iraq in 1991 are examined and their implications debated, the battle over the nature of future wars has been joined. The scientists want to delegate more of the fighting to the "brilliant" weapons that

they hope to develop and deploy by the turn of the century; the generals want to keep human operators "in the loop."

The leading military concept of the new era might be called "cyberwar," in which robots do much of the killing and destroying without direct instructions from human operators. The weapons would be "autonomous," to use one of the weapons designers' favourite words.

The outcome of the machines v. people controversy is critically important, not only because it will determine the relationship between human and computer-based intelligence at the beginning of an era that many observers see as marked by competition between the two, but because it will determine the nature of future wars. It's important to note that the debate is no longer over the desirability of more advanced weaponry, even though many observers believe the Gulf War demonstrated that the U. S. lead is so great that the frenetic pursuit of new military technologies at the Cold War pace is no longer necessary.

The issue now is how the power of technology—especially of advanced computers—will be applied to military problems, and what role human operators will play. The "smart" weapons used in Vietnam and Iraq were guided by pilots via an electronic data link; but the future, some say, will be dominated by "brilliant"

There is a long-term struggle that will redefine the relationship of humans to machine in matters of war. But one outcome of the struggle already seems clear: No matter which side "wins," humans will lose.

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cruise missiles that require no human guidance after launch.

Organized labour's fight against automation over the last three decades foreshadowed many of the issues now being argued in the Pentagon. In industry, most observers agree that when machines can be used to decrease job-related dangers faced by human beings—on the assembly line or in mining operations, for instance—machines should be used. But when the risks are relatively low and jobs are automated primarily to cut costs or make profits, support for automation is not as strong.

Similarly, the armed services agree that smart bombs and cruise missiles should be used to save pilots from being shot down and taken prisoner or killed, but they are less than comfortable with the full-blown cyberwar concept. They fear that cruise missiles will supersede piloted bombers and aircraft carriers—respectively, the U.S. Air Force's and Navy's favourite programme—and put pilots out of work. But they also note that, unlike industrial robots that perform their tasks more accurately and reliably than humans, cruise missiles are—and will remain—less accurate and reliable than weapons directed by piloted bombers.

More serious issues arise regarding the targets of autonomous weapons. Missile-guidance computers, albeit with initial instructions from human operators, would decide where and when to detonate their warheads—that is, whom to kill and what to destroy.

Although the idea of cyberwar may be discomfiting to anyone who has seen the "Terminator" movies, in which human-like robots are programmed to kill anyone who stands between them and the completion of their mission, the services' preferred alternative is also problematic. The services promote centralized systems like the air force's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the army and air forces' Joint Surveillance and Target-Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and the navy's ship-borne equivalent of AWACS, called "Aegis."

Human judgment is required in these systems, but computers screen and filter a

daunting array of data that would otherwise overwhelm a human operator. As new sensors provide more data collected over greater areas, and as the pace of combat accelerates, the role of the computer

rapidly expands. Human operators, their decisions practically prescribed by computer, will become, in essence, subordinate to their machines.

Cyberwar promoters cite a number of reasons for investing in smart weapons. One convoluted argument is based on the theory that if brilliant weapons could seek out and destroy the nuclear arsenal of a developing country, it would permit the West to give up its nuclear weapons—and thereby stigmatize the nuclear programme of developing countries. But will smart weapons ever be that good?

THE NAVY'S Tomahawk cruise missile is a good starting point in answering that question. It is the first weapon in a series that supporters say will culminate in tomorrow's autonomous cruise missiles. Despite the military claims during the Gulf War, the Tomahawk (now deployed only in non-nuclear land-attack and anti-ship versions), is a long way from brilliant. Nevertheless, with its latest post-Gulf War improvements in place, it represents the state of the art.

The conventional land-attack Tomahawk's camera scans the terrain as it flies over, reducing each image to 940 ones and zeros. This binary computer-image is then compared with matrices already stored in the missile's memory. Because it relies on pre-programmed images, the Tomahawk can fly only to a single, identifiable, stationary target on a map, where it explodes.

Navy planners assume that half of all Tomahawks will miss their targets by more than 15 meters. Bad weather, daily changes in lighting, and other mundane complications can send the missile off course, and scenes that the Tomahawk can reliably identify are difficult for planners to find. The last two Tomahawks tested in early 1992 in favourable conditions over very simple ranges in Florida, fell wide of the mark—one by 100 kilometres, the other by 50.

The Tomahawk's performance in the Gulf War illustrates its limitations. Navy planners deemed fewer than 50 Iraqi targets suitable for the missile. And they are still not sure how well it performed. Many targets could have been safely allocated to bombers but were reserved for cruise missiles after Sen. Jesse Helms Foreign Relations Committee, put the navy on notice in prewar hearings that he expected a dramatic demonstration of the Tomahawk during the war.

Although the Tomahawk is primarily designed for use against fixed air-defence installations (which probably accounted for no more than 10 of the 50 Gulf War targets), the navy also marked Iraq's

Cyberwar promoters argue that if brilliant weapons could seek out and destroy the nuclear arsenal of a developing country, it would permit the West to give up its nuclear weapons—and thereby stigmatize the nuclear programme of developing countries.

presidential palace, defence ministry, several sites in the Iraqi industrial base for the missile's first 'real-war test'. All the targets were initially covered by at least two missiles, as is standard navy practice. The air force, skeptical of the navy's claim for the missile reliability and accuracy, given its notoriously poor performance even in a carefully controlled testing programme, immediately doubled the numbers.

Over the course of a three-week period, 282 of the \$1 million missiles were launched - including 30 against a missile factory and another 30 against a chemical warfare facility, each of which could have been bombed easily and less expensively by piloted aircraft. Navy officials have retreated from initial claims that the missile was more than 90 percent effective, and they now acknowledge that they do not know how well the Tomahawk did. Unlike piloted bombers, cruise missiles do not return to their bases with video footage of the damage done to targets.

If future cruise missiles are to be truly autonomous and are to seek out and destroy nuclear weapons - mobile missiles, for example - something much more capable than the Tomahawk will be necessary. Huge design consortia that include Texas Instruments, Martin Marietta, and Hughes have assembled research and development programmes with ominous names like Thirsty Saber, Damocles, Aladdin and Warbreaker. According to defence contractors, a brilliant cruise missile able to seek out and destroy mobile missiles could be deployed with eight years, at a cost of about \$3 million apiece.

Since these missiles will not be as accurate as laser-guided bombs, they are unlikely to be cost competitive with bombs. Richard Garwin, the physicist who helped introduce the Tomahawk to a reluctant navy in the 1970's, has calculated that the cruise missiles are not an economical alternative if the cost is more than about \$100,000 apiece.

Current research and development programme emphasize components that will improve cruise missiles in mundane ways. But there has been no breakthrough in the key area, software development. Contractors have focused on hardware, primarily on more efficient engines and "stealth" technologies. Progress in guidance-systems research has been made in new sensor systems adapted to missile airframes, and in miniaturizing advanced computers. Sensors under consideration for brilliant cruise missiles include laser radars, millimetre-wave radars, synthetic aperture radars, and imaging infrared systems, all of which have been applied successfully to less demanding problems.

But improvements in software have not kept up. After years of working on algorithms in an area of artificial intelligence called "automatic target rec-

ognition," programmers are stymied. The latest approaches to pattern- (and thus target) recognition include "neural networking" and parallel processing systems, but neither has added greater capabilities, only more speed.

According to programmers working on cruise-missile guidance software, automatic target recognition requires a fundamentally new capability which parallel processing—a "brute force" improvement—cannot provide. Defence contractors are incorporating the latest advances in "machine learning." They would show models to their target recognition computers from a number of different angles so that the computers "remember" the most significant characteristics. In effect, they are mimicking human pilots' target-recognition training. However, the human brain is still much better at pattern matching and, more important, shows better judgment in ambiguous cases.

The ability to compensate for ambiguity is very important, especially in overcoming countermeasures. Any target so valuable that the United States would send brilliant cruise missiles after it is likely to be hidden, camouflaged, and surrounded by decoys designed to conceal it from human pilots flying bombers loaded with sophisticated sensors. In the Gulf War, human pilots were fooled by simple countermeasures. Iraqi missile launchers were hidden in camouflaged bunkers while sophisticated decoys, mimicking the real

launchers' appearance and heat emissions, distracted pilots from their quarry. The chief of the Israeli air force during the war and a U.S. Marine detailed to the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq both say they doubt that U.S. pilots destroyed even a single mobile missile launcher, even with the F-15E Strike Eagle, arguably the world's most sophisticated bomber. The U.S. military's JSTARS surveillance system, essentially a commercial airliner full of the latest sensors, computers, and trained personnel, was unable to locate Iraqi mobile missile launchers at any time.

During the war, U.S. pilots mistakenly attacked civilian trucks, buses loaded with refugees, and even Bedouin encampments in their frantic search for missile launchers, even though they were unhampered by Iraqi defences and had plenty of time to verify their targets. In the mountains, forests, or jungles typical of other countries, mobile targets

The U.S. military's JSTARS surveillance system, essentially a commercial airliner full of the latest sensors, computers, and trained personnel, was unable to locate Iraqi mobile missile launchers at any time.

would be even more difficult to find, especially since cruise missiles have less endurance, carry fewer and less powerful sensors, and are much less intelligent and adept at target recognition than an F-15E or a JSTARS aircraft and its crew. If future brilliant cruise missiles are programmed never to attack ambiguous targets, they would be defeated easily. But if they are programmed always to do so, civilian casualties and losses to "friendly fire" would increase drastically.

The story of Tacit Rainbow exemplifies some of the difficulties of programming brilliant weaponry against countermeasures. The Tacit Rainbow was to be a special kind of autonomous cruise missile: a long-range anti-radar drone. The Pentagon envisioned launching hundreds of Tacit Rainbows from trucks and airplanes into Warsaw Pact airspace upon learning of a Soviet drive into Western Europe. Theoretically, once over enemy-held territory, the missiles would circle and search for up to three hours if necessary; they would listen for air-defence radars to turn on, then would swoop down and destroy them. The Tacit Rainbow's success thus depended on a degree of cooperation from the target, whose operation created a beacon broadcasting its presence and significance. Even so, bugs in the Tacit Rainbow system's software could not be worked out and the contractors acknowledged that they would probably not be able to keep an adequate library of enemy radar signals up to date. Tacit Rainbow was cancelled last year.

In the civilian world, academic researchers studying similar problems say that pattern-recognition software is getting fairly good

at identifying cooperative objects, such as radars that have been turned on, or most targets in Pentagon 'tests'. For objects that do not co-operate but do not hide (roads and

buildings, for example), progress is steady. But researchers say there is no evidence of headway in development for detecting hidden objects.

It may not be too surprising if by the year 2000 there are still no autonomous missiles deployed in the U.S. stockpile. Some defence contractors have already revised their concepts, as frequently happens when systems go from a DARPA concept to real military hardware. For example, instead of autonomous missiles, General Dynamics is now promoting a long-range cruise missile that could

fly as far as 3,000 kilometres to a waiting area, then be guided to its target by a piloted aircraft. Similarly, earlier efforts to mount automatic target recognition equipment on the F-15E and the new Comanche attack helicopter (in an attempt to replace a second crewman) have been marked by hasty redesigns to reintroduce a copilot into the loop.

Although it is hard to justify the added expense of a long-range cruise missile that is dependent on a spotter aircraft, the spotter-plane concept is more compatible with other recent developments in the U.S. military technology and operational practice that is the concept of the lone robot. Global communication by satellite and the increased use of systems like JSTARS and AWACS are driving the military towards more centralized planning and execution. Today's fighter pilot is usually directed towards his target by AWACS operators and fires his air-to-air missiles as blips on a monitor without ever seeing an enemy aircraft, except perhaps as a distant explosion and a puff of smoke.

Ground combat control would be similarly centralized. JSTARS planes would circle near the battlefields of the future, pick out targets, and instruct bomber pilots of missile and artillery batteries where and when to shoot. If final guidance were needed, it could be furnished by spotter planes.

THIS NEW ERA in land warfare is still a gleam in the designer's eye. During the Gulf War, JSTARS could not distinguish between tanks and trucks, much less between military and civilian, or allied and enemy vehicles. The communications systems are vulnerable to jamming, and the JSTARS aircraft is a radar beacon that could easily be destroyed. Nevertheless, mainstream military planning emphasizes the AWACS/JSTARS approach—which requires having human operators securely in the decision loops.

But there are serious reasons to doubt an operator's ability to grasp the mass of information collected and presented by sensors and computers. An example of a wrong choice based on computer-provided information was the decision made in 1988 by the crew of an Aegis cruiser, the U.S.S. Vincennes. During the U.S. tanker-escort mission in the Persian Gulf near the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the crew of the Vincennes—basically a seaborne AWACS armed with air-defence missiles—was misled by the way its computer presented information and mistook a commuting airliner (flying at its scheduled time in a designated flight corridor) for an Iranian bomber, and destroyed it.

In effect, judgments made by the Aegis system's

The continued pursuit of exotic military technologies suggests a belief that the United States will be engaged in endless conflict. It also influences the way political leaders think about the probability or desirability of war

software (as instructed by human programmers) determined the course of action. The crew of the Vincennes was so confident that its computer was correct that opposing judgments made by the nearby U.S.S. Sides' crew and the AWACS aircraft software and crew responsible for the area either were not solicited or were not heeded. Tellingly, the Vincennes's hubris had earlier earned it the nickname "Robo-cruiser."

In the future, more information will be filtered through military computers, increasing both the operators' confidence in their grasp of the situation, and the amount of information that the computer will have to withhold to avoid overwhelming a crew already working under tremendous stress and fear. As the greater speed of war forces humans to make faster and faster decisions, they may only be able to rubber-stamp computer decisions—although "human error" will no doubt be blamed.

An unfortunate appraisal of the U.S. role in the post-Cold War world is implicit in the current technological enthusiasm and theoretical strategizing. The continued pursuit of exotic military technologies suggests a belief that the United States will be engaged in endless conflict. It also influences the way political leaders think about the probability or desirability of war—hence the pundits' interest in cyberwar technologies.

Meanwhile, with the former Soviet Union gone, Washington is finding it difficult to identify plausible enemies, or even to decide whether enemies should be the basis of the defence budget. Last year, Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, was criticized for his view that current spending plans could be justified without a "threat." In February, the perils of thinking about hypothetical threats in public were demonstrated when one of the Pentagon's menus of possible conflicts was leaked to the New York Times. On the list were seven types of war, ranging from Panamanian counter-insurgency to pushing Russia out of Lithuania. Although these scenarios were ridiculed, defence contractors have come up with even wilder justifications for their programme, including such bizarre claims as the nation's need to defend against South American nuclear missiles and submarines or to launch a massive cruise-missile attack on India.

Motivating these imaginary conflicts is a need to justify Cold War budgets, scientific bureaucracies, and programmes that are no longer necessary. Using current technology, U.S. air power recently defeated one of best air defence systems in the developing world with few losses. It used air supremacy to pulverize the Iraqi armed forces and

industry. It is difficult to believe that ever-more sophisticated missiles are needed for feeble foes like Cuba or North Korea.

Since U.S. Military technology defines the state of the art, a more sensible approach to military supremacy might be to abandon the traditional emphasis on continual modernization in favour of measures assuring that no arms more sophisticated than those fielded by Iraq become available to countries inclined to war against the United States or its allies.

It is unlikely that brilliant weapons can ever live up to promoters' promises - promises that imply the long-sought grail of 'discriminated' warfare attainable. Even if it were, cyberwar technologies could make U.S. decision-makers less reluctant to fight wars abroad. Two years ago, some U.S. political elites sorely wanted to believe that smart weapons allowed 'the surgical and progressive elimination of Iraq's military capabilities'—Henry Kissinger's words in arguing for an early attack on Iraq—despite testimony of the administration's own military experts that the war would be anything but surgical. We now know that the military experts were right and Kissinger was wrong.

Still, it has not been long since the Gulf War, and there have already been serious, if quite, calls in Washington to use the nation's newly proven hyperwar arsenal to avenge those killed in the Lockerbie bombing, to knock out Pyongyang's nuclear facilities, and to unseat Fidel Castro. None of these scenarios is likely. But the hawks' belief in the country's military technology and therefore their confidence in the ability to intervene abroad appear to have been reinvigorated. ■

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Reviews

Bertrand Russell, Caroline Moorehead
Sinclair-Stevenson London, 1992
£20.00

Publisher: Why not write a biography of Bertrand Russell?

Biographer: But what could possibly surpass his autobiography in scope, detail and honesty?

Publisher: Look for an angle - how about his sex life, his wives, and his affairs? Or the last decade of his life where it is rumoured that he became a Trilby like figure under the influence of his Svengali secretary, Ralph Schoenman.

This is, of course, an imaginary conversation but Caroline Moorehead's biography of Bertrand Russell reads as if it might have started life this way; she has allowed her book to be dominated by Russell's relationships with women and with his secretary, Ralph Schoenman.

Throughout Russell's life, attacks were made by his political opponents on his personal life and morals in order to try and discredit his ideas and the many unpopular causes he championed. In my view, who, where, when and how often he was screwing should only be of interest to the participants not to the whole world. Schoenman's relationship and his influence on Russell are important and they should be recorded, but in this book it read like tittle-tattle and telling of stories out of class.

I worked for Russell in 1963-64 as one of his secretaries and was mainly involved with his anti-nuclear work. Caroline Moorehead interviewed me in 1990 and took notes of our conversation. She recounts a number of anecdotes that I told her about Russell's work and his relationship with his principal secretary, Ralph Schoenman, a young American radical who in 1960 convinced Russell of the necessity of a campaign of civil disobedience against nuclear weapons.

The anecdotes attributed to me, however, are a distortion of what I told her, and one anecdote is wrongly attributed to

me. For example I recounted an incident in 1963 when Ralph Schoenman and I at the invitation of the governments of India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and China visited these countries as Russell's emissaries. We had a meeting with Pandit Nehru, Mrs Bandaranaike and Chou-En-Lai. I explained to Caroline Moorehead that this was a diplomatic mission but that diplomats 'we were not'. Having arrived in India and being there for a few hours, our host at the Gandhi Peace Foundation asked if we had any first impressions of his country. 'Yeh', Ralph replied. 'How do you fuck in this heat?' Our host at first startled by this blunt response entered into Ralph's unorthodox spirit and replied, 'Quickly, Mr Schoenman, very quickly'. I found our host's reply in the circumstance quite funny and a tacit acceptance of our undiplomatic behaviour. Caroline Moorehead omits the reply thus depriving the story of its central point and showing Schoenman in a worse light than I intended.

This may seem rather trivial but if I were to judge this book on the errors in the remarks attributed to me I would be concerned about the accuracy of the rest of the text. However, despite this, I must admit, I found the book enjoyable and an easy read.

Bertrand Russell was an outcast all his life. Born in 1872 into the aristocracy, he soon alienated the establishment with his radical views and his opposition to the First World War eventually led to his imprisonment. Having cut himself off from his establishment background he soon fell out over his criticism of the Russian Revolution with his new found Fabian friends, such as Bernard Shaw and the Webbs.

Russell championed the underdog, he hated bullies, he loathed war and all its preparations. It seems that we put people on pedestals only to knock them off. The Bertrand Russell I remember is best captured in this extract:

'At 9.15 pm on 23 December 1954, on the Home Service, Russell gave one of the most dramatic talks ever heard on the radio. His audience, it was later estimated, was somewhere between six and seven million. He was solemn, dignified and extremely alarming. No one was yet certain about the powers of these bombs, but it was now generally accepted by scien-

tists that a war with hydrogen bombs would cause civilisation to disintegrate and possibly put an end to the human race. For a fortunate few, death would come suddenly. For the majority, there would be a "slow torture of disease and disintegration".

He ended his talk with the words he used again and again, and whose sonority made them immediately memorable. "There lies before us if we choose," he said in those precise Whiggish tones which made his voice so distinct, "continual progress in happiness, knowledge and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death because we cannot forget our quarrels? I appeal, as a human being to human beings: remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new paradise; if you cannot, nothing lies before you but universal death." It was all very stark but, in true Russell style, not without hope. It was up to mankind, he said, as in all other things, to stop the bombs. People, as he repeated all his life, are not victims unless they make themselves so. But they have to find the courage to bring about change.'

Pat Pottle

Nonviolent Struggle for Social Defence
Ed Shelley Anderson and Janet Larmore,
WRI 1991 £5.00

In April 1990 the War Resisters International and the International Fellowship of Reconciliation organised a conference on Social Defence at Bradford University. This book publishes a selection of papers presented to the conference in the heady days less than 12 months after both Tiananmen Square and the European revolutions of autumn 1989.

There are case studies of people's power in the Philippines - and how it turned sour; the Palestinian Intifada - described as 'unarmed' rather than nonviolent; the 'velvet' revolution in Czechoslovakia; struggles over local issues in India; the struggle for democracy in Chile; the too little known

war zone

WAR ZONE UPDATE

Nagorno-Karabakh

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is, so far, the bloodiest in the former Soviet Union. The death-toll in nearly 5 years is thought to be at least 2,000. In dispute is the control of Nagorno-Karabakh where 180,000 Christian Armenians live in an enclave of Muslim Azerbaijan. Since May, the war has been extended into Nakhichevan, bordering both Turkey and Iran, where 300,000 Muslim Azeris occupy an enclave in Christian Armenia. The dispute goes back to transfers of territory made by Turkey and the USSR in the early 1920s.



Both Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and Azeris in Nakhichevan fear genocide and claim to be fighting for their lives and homelands. The Azerbaijan government says the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is about territorial integrity and the rule of law, and the presence of armed Armenian rebels within Azerbaijan is intolerable. Fighting was extended into Nakhichevan when an Armenian offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh secured a supply corridor to Armenia, essential, the Ar-

menian government claimed, for getting humanitarian aid to Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. But the immediate effect was to isolate Nakhichevan Azeris from Azerbaijan, so confirming their worst fears of Armenian intentions. Mediation efforts by Russia and Kazakhstan

have failed. The Commonwealth of Independent States, the UN and the CSCE (to all of which both Armenia and Azerbaijan belong) support the rule that borders cannot be changed by force, so Armenia considers they can do nothing to help Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of ex-Soviet troops from Nagorno-Karabakh, sophisticated weapons of modern war have become available. Combat helicopters, heat-seeking missiles and tanks have replaced

hunting rifles. Azerbaijan has decided to form its own modern army. Nor surprisingly, Armenia has appealed to its people around the world to return to defend the homeland and to the UN to succour its people in Nagorno-Karabakh. The form of warfare is increasingly familiar: aerial bombing and artillery bombardment of towns and villages, massacres of civilians on both sides, irregular soldiers out of control and large numbers of refugees with nowhere to go. The extension of fighting into Nakhichevan has alarmed both Turkey and Iran, who are old rivals for influence in Turkish-speaking Muslim Azerbaijan. About 15m Azeris and 1m Armenians live in Iran. Turkey, anxious not to reawaken old hostilities with Armenia, wants an international peace effort. But Nagorno-Karabakh is not yet an international priority. The conflict does, however, raise some basic international questions, eg: to what extent and when should the demands of a minority overrule the laws of a state? are borders really inviolable? when and how should other states intervene?

contribution of the Freedom and Peace group to the Polish protest movement; and responses to the military coups in Fiji. Most poignant is an eyewitness account of Tiananmen Square.

If the Yugoslavian contribution now seems dated, its essential aspiration for a country without an army is as relevant as ever. That also relates to the major essay in the book - almost half the total - Brian Martin's 'Arguments and Actions about Social Defence'. His presentation is perhaps closer to the PPU's concept of 'defence' than the contribution of Gene Sharp. In a series of questions and answers Martin takes the reader through definitions of social defence, its distinction from military defence, and its development in a number of historical examples.



More importantly for pacifists, Martin stresses the essential relationship between social defence against a supposed exter-

nal 'enemy' and the struggle for social justice in both one's present country and the world generally. Just as one way of dealing with Hitler should have been more support from outside for those who resisted him inside Germany, so social defence now must be related to struggles against repression in other countries, which includes welcoming refugees from those countries instead of seeing them, as our present government suggests, as invaders.

Bill Hetherington

Nonviolent Struggle for Social Defence is available from PPU. Please add 60p post & packing.

diary

PPU Conference AGM 1993

New World Order in peace or in pieces?

The PPU AGM in 1993 will be a weekend, residential conference at Hulme Hall in Manchester from Friday evening 26 March to Sunday afternoon 28 March. Cost, including single-room accommodation, all meals and refreshments, will be on a sliding scale from £30 - £90. Members who cannot attend are welcome to send donations to help towards bursaries (of which there will be a limited number). Booking forms will be sent out early next year. The conference section of the weekend is open to non-members.

16 January: PPU Council meeting 11.30 am Dick Sheppard House.

25 January: First of a series of seminars on peacemaking in former Yugoslavia, Chapter House, Southwark Cathedral. Patrick Logan, Social Responsibility Dept. 4 Chapel Court, Borough High St London SE1 1HW (071 403 8686). 29-31 January: World Disarmament Campaign services and vigils for disarmament. WDC, 45-47 Blythe St London E2 6 LX.

30 January: Memorial service on 45th anniversary of Gandhi's assassination, St James's, 197 Piccadilly, London WC1, 6.30pm. Gandhi Foundation, Kingsley Hall, Powis Rd, London E3 3HJ (081 981 7628).

Every Monday: Picket for lifting of sanctions against Iraq, outside Foreign Office Whitehall, 5-7. ARROW, c/o David Polden (071 607 5013)

Every Friday: Nonviolent prayer vigil against all forms of arms trade outside DESO office, Stuart House, Soho Sq. Mary Ann (071 987 1552) or Roger (081 303 4074).

Every Friday: Vigil against Trident, Buchanan Street, Glasgow, 5-6. Philip (041 339 5372)

Second Sunday of every month: Vigil at main gate USAF Upper Hayford, 11am-1pm.

the pacifist

As noted in the last issue of *The Pacifist*, the magazine's name and brief were being discussed. It has now been agreed that a magazine replacing *The Pacifist* will be launched in June and will be called *Peace Matters*. The last issue of *The Pacifist* will be published in March.

Many of the details surrounding the launching of the new magazine are still being discussed and worked on. This will be an enormous and exciting task and readers' help would be appreciated. Help will also be needed with publicity and sales; readers' help to publicise the new magazine in their area would therefore be very welcome. Publicity material for this will be available nearer the launch date.

We are also enlarging the range of contributors and if you have any specialist knowledge in the areas and issues we are likely to be tackling we would very much like to hear from you.

The replacing of *The Pacifist* with *Peace Matters* is not simply a change of name but is a shift of emphasis from broadly providing a service for members to pro-

moting pacifism and nonviolence to a wider constituency with members' support. The aims of the new magazine will therefore be to explain pacifism and non-violence to those unfamiliar with such views, to examine issues and events from a nonviolent perspective and to examine pacifism and nonviolence itself.

• If you would like to help in the ways mentioned above please get in touch with Jan Melichar as soon as possible.

publications

Other changes are also under way. The PPU's publication policy is being thoroughly overhauled. The first change you will see will be when next months mailing drops though your letterbox! But the range of publications, the issues they raise and the audiences they are directed at is also being revised. All these are part of a process of making the PPU a more effective organisation with a clearer voice and a sharper challenge to the status quo.

50 YEARS AGO

Will we help the Jews?

When the mass-murder of East European Jews began to be 'plugged' in the press, it was hardly possible to believe that the information was entirely new. Murder on such a scale must needs out...If only one quarter of the charges are true, it is more than enough to damn the Nazi instigators and their instruments. But even without this fresh spate of atrocities we knew, long before the war began, of the systematic barbarities of the Nazis towards the Jews.

And here's the rub. What did we do, as a nation, to help the Jews in the pre-war days? Did we offer them refuge in this country? Did we even permit them freely to enter their national state in Palestine? We did nothing at all to help them when we could have helped them greatly. Now in 1943 we can do practically nothing to help them.

Is it being hopelessly cynical to be suspicious that anti-Jewish atrocities are now being 'plugged' because it is safe to do so - it involves us in no action at all? Is it being hopelessly cynical to feel a contrast between our silence on the slow starvation of Belgium and Greece and the vehemence of our denunciation of the barbarities against the eastern Jews?

We could, instead of breathing fire and slaughter and retribution against their torturers, publish to the world and to the Nazi government that we are prepared to give the Jews asylum now. Where there is a will there is a way.

Peace News, 1 January 1943

Letters

letters

One answer too far

Of course the 'ultimate pacifist goal is...to alter government policies in military defence' - David Evans (review) certainly surprise me by his attitude to April Carter's sentence. I would also hope that if you asked ten pacifists, 'What is the ultimate pacifist goal?' you would get two answers, at most. Perhaps some people have attended too many PPU AGM's.

The ultimate pacifist goal is surely a world without war. A world in which war is never considered as an option. We can abolish war like we abolished slavery. Okay, slavery has not quite been eradicated, but compared with the situation from ancient times (e.g. in the Roman Empire) until abolition in the American South, it is slight. If all those who oppose slavery had just considered anti-slavery to be a way of life, or a means, or a way, they would have been a lot less successful.

Perhaps to make my definition of the goal clearer, I had better define the word 'war'. War is the attempt, by a group, to impose their will or get what they want, or defend themselves or others, by means of lethal weapons.

If we are going to have a world in which war is never even considered as an option, then of course government policies on military defence have to be changed.

Personally, I think war is closely related to torture. They both depend on the willingness of people to be cruel to other people, and we could usefully campaign against both at once.

I don't say that we haven't a long, long way to go. But just because the goal is far away doesn't mean that it isn't there or is unattainable.

Jim Haigh
8 Penyale, Longhorpe
Peterborough
Cambridgeshire PE3 6RY

Expedite doubts

As a relatively new member of the PPU, I must express doubts about rejecting armed interventions in all circumstances. What should the pacifist viewpoint be regarding the plight of civilians in places such as

Bosnia and Somalia? Should the world stand by while thousands starve to death? Surely it is only right that other nations try to alleviate the suffering of innocent civilians caught up in armed conflict. And if those who deliver aid are attacked, should they not have the means to defend themselves? These questions are obviously complex, and I would welcome a debate through the columns of The Pacifist.

Philip Shields
7 Queensmead
Beverley
Humberside HU17 8PQ

Roy Walker

Older members will be sad to hear of the death in October, at the age of 79, of Roy Walker, a key worker and writer for the PPU during World War Two.

Roy joined the Union in 1936 and within a year joined the staff at the Regent Street offices, where he worked with Dick Sheppard amongst others. His first responsibility was in the field of group development and campaigning, but soon after WW2 began he became involved in the issue of the Allied blockade of food supplies to occupied Europe. In 1940 his pamphlet *Who Starves?* was published, followed by a book, *Famine Over Europe*, and seven more pamphlets before the war ended. When the PPU set up its own Food Relief Campaign in 1942 Roy served as secretary of the campaign committee under the active chairing of Vera Brittain. He also briefed Bishop George Bell for the latter's impassioned speech in the House of Lords which led to a parallel Famine Relief Committee, still subsisting today in the form of Oxfam.

Roy's activities of speaking, writing and organising delegations to the Ministry of Economic Warfare were interrupted by six months' gaol for refusing to register for military service. Nevertheless, he found time for writing on other aspects of nonviolence, including a life of Gandhi, and an account of Norwegian nonviolent resistance to the Nazis.

Although he drifted away from the PPU after leaving the staff in 1946, and carved out a literary career in which he became drama critic for The Times, he never wavered from his pacifist commitment. With this in mind, his family sought out the PPU to obtain White Poppies for a wreath at his Remembrance Day funeral.

BH

**PPU AGM 1993
MOTIONS**

1. This AGM of the PPU resolves that for the present Preamble to the Standing Orders for the conduct of Annual General Meetings there shall be substituted the following:

'For the business of the Annual General Meeting and Special General Meetings the following Standing Orders shall apply, except where they are varied in any special case upon the recommendation of the Standing Orders Committee.'

Note: The present Preamble reads: 'For the general business of the Annual General Meeting the following Standing Orders apply, except where they may be amended by any special recommendation of the Standing Orders Committee.' The effect of the proposed new wording is to clarify ambiguities and to incorporate a previous (1986) decision to extend Standing Orders to Special General Meetings. There would be no practical change in the operation of Standing Orders or Standing Orders Committee.

Proposed by Standing Orders Committee

2. This AGM of the PPU recognises that the Group structure of the Union is weak, and instructs Council to take whatever steps may be deemed suitable to encourage activities on both a regional and a national level, and in particular urges Council to promote activities for peace in named provincial towns to be agreed by Council in conjunction with local members.

Proposed by Allen and Kathleen Jackson

3. This AGM of the PPU recognises that both peace promotion and opposition to violence and militarism are necessary in the building of a peaceful society. It therefore instructs Council to promote action for practical peacemaking; one example might be promoting the conversion of factory production from military to peaceful purposes.

Proposed by Allen and Kathleen Jackson

Amendments to Motions, signed by two PPU members, must reach Dick Sheppard House by 3.00 pm on Friday, 12 February 1993.

It's Just a Game - isn't it?

The Future Entertainment Show was one of the many promotional shows to take place in the run up to Christmas. The cover of the show's catalogue boasts that the visitor will see 'The Future Today'. **Jude Aldridge** visited the show and saw the future.

WANDERING AROUND the edge of Earl's Court, desperately trying to find the entrance to the Future Entertainment Show, one becomes mesmerized by the tribal beat drifting from the walls, somewhat reminiscent of a disco with the bass turned up too high.

'Mesmerize' seems the key word to the entire show, for upon entering the exhibition hall one is impressed by the vast number of fully-grown, Caucasian males staring, zombie-like at tiny video screens. Apart from the dreadful music and the sonic 'pings' coming from every direction, the lack of human noise is startling. Computer games are taken very seriously indeed.

Games ranging from the bizarre; 'James Pond: Codename Robocod', in which a Special Agent fish tries to protect the North Pole's toy factories from the evil Dr. Maybe's bombs, through the average, 'Pro. Golf' and 'League Basketball', to the downright worrying, 'Desert Strike'; all are represented here.

'...your task is to make places safe for truth, democracy and the American way by blowing up a rather large number of buildings.'

The selling point of these games is simple, 'Violence Sells', a review of an ice-hockey game sums this up '...end to end, nerve-tinglingly violent and incredibly hard-hitting action...You've been warned.' Some are politically blatant, '...your task is to make places safe for truth, democracy and the American way by blowing up a rather large number of buildings.' (Thunderhawk AH-73M - Core Design). Even such a tongue-in-cheek description can not fail to produce a rather sickening reaction, that this can be considered a fit subject for a game.

'Desert Strike' produced by 'Electronic Arts' represents the most disturbing end of the multi-billion dollar computer games market. The description in the 'Mega-Drive' catalogue speaks volumes:

'Pilot your AH-64 Apache helicopter on a covert strike against a ruthless military dictator.'

- 27 missions of all-blasting action.
- Take out tanks, SCUDs and nuclear reactors.
- Rescue POWs and hostages used as human shields.
- Massive cinematic introduction mid-game and end-game sequences pay off your victories with full screen graphics.'

This 'game' like its compatriots 'F22 Interceptor' and 'The Battle of Britain' is clearly based on a real-life incident, in this case The Gulf War, and the children playing it are not ignorant of the fact either. Eleven year-old Tim enthusiastically grasping his joy-stick glances over to where I stand with

wants for Christmas.' Mick looks a little embarrassed. He's given his son the day off school to bring him here, he is far from unique in this act.

A few parents admitted the expense of their child's hobby, the impending Christmas overdrafts and their slight concern at the amount of time their child (generally male) spent in front of their computer console, but the concept that their child was playing at killing did not seem to cross their minds. Tim wants to be a footballer when he grows up but in the meantime he's quite happy taking out 'some more Iraqis.' What a way to grow up?!

The overwhelming attitude of both visitors and promotional staff was a non-committal one. Nobody was willing to state categorically that such play was harmless, the phrase of the day was a resounding, 'It's just a game, isn't it?' A handful commented that it was better that such violence was played out on the small screen rather than in real-life, but this begs the question whether an industry that so accurately reproduces real-life events is really trying to replace them. I doubt whether these high-powered executives even consider the implication of encouraging children to re-enact the atrocities of warfare.

his Father and calls, 'I've taken out some more Iraqis, Dad', he grins wickedly and returns to his play. His Father, Mick shrugs and looks tired and uncomfortable when I question the morality of producing games such as 'Desert Strike', 'Aye, I don't know if they should on the grounds of people who might have lost someone, or been involved in the war....Still, it's what he



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